

1 **Public Health and Safety**

2 **Introduction**

3 The health and safety concerns present in the project area are both natural and human caused. Many
 4 of the health and safety issues described are themselves the topics of separate resource sections of this
 5 FEIS. Whereas those sections primarily address the effects on the environment, this “Public Health
 6 and Safety” resource section focuses on the potential impacts of those resources on human health and
 7 safety. Analysis of health and safety is restricted to that of the general public not involved in mine
 8 operations. Health and safety risks to mine personnel are regulated by MSHA and are not addressed in
 9 this analysis.

10 **Changes from the Draft Environmental Impact Statement**

11 The Coronado reviewed comments on the DEIS regarding public health and safety. In general, the
 12 comments expressed concern with the effects of air pollution from the mine on human health,
 13 especially for people with respiratory health problems, as well as the potential effects on public safety
 14 from mine related traffic on SR 83, including the transportation of hazardous materials. After
 15 reviewing these comments, the Coronado reviewed the public health and safety analysis that was
 16 conducted for the DEIS and determined that revision of the analysis is not necessary, with the
 17 exception of three updates: (1) the Coronado has revised the air quality model, and all Federal air
 18 quality standards are expected to be met at the perimeter fenceline for the proposed action, Phased
 19 Tailings Alternative, and Barrel Alternative (see the “Air Quality and Climate Change” resource
 20 section in this chapter); (2) the analysis has been updated to disclose the impacts of mine related
 21 traffic on SR 83 based on revised mine traffic information and traffic projections, which is now
 22 contained in the “Transportation/Access” resource section of chapter 3; and (3) the analysis has been
 23 updated to reflect the Barrel Alternative’s modification, which eliminated the heap leach and oxide
 24 ore processing facilities for that alternative (see the “Alternative 4 – Barrel Alternative” section in
 25 chapter 2; see also table 192 and the following parts of this resource section: “Use and Transportation
 26 of Hazardous Materials,” “Effects of Onsite Storage of Sulfuric Acid,” “Effects of Transportation of
 27 Hazardous Materials,” “Emergency Response to Accidents and Spills on Public Roadways,” and
 28 “Mitigation and Monitoring – Other Regulatory and Permitting Agencies”).

29 Regarding air pollution effects on human health, the Coronado has updated the air models in response
 30 to comments from agencies and the public (see the “Air Quality and Climate Change” resource
 31 section in this chapter). The revised air quality model indicates that all Federal air quality standards
 32 would be met at the perimeter fenceline for three of the action alternatives. Federal air quality
 33 standards are set by the EPA and have two goals: the primary goal is to protect public health,
 34 including the health of “sensitive” populations such as asthmatics, children, and the elderly; the
 35 secondary goal is to protect public welfare against decreased visibility as well as damage to animals,
 36 crops, vegetation, and buildings. Based on the original air quality model, the DEIS anticipated that
 37 two violations of Federal air quality standards would occur. This resource section has been updated
 38 with the findings from the revised modeling results, which indicate that Federal air quality standards
 39 would be met at the perimeter fenceline with the exception of the Barrel Trail and Scholefield-
 40 McCleary Alternatives (see table 192 and the following parts in this section: “Existing Conditions,”
 41 “Air Quality and Recreation Hazards,” “Environmental Consequences, Air Quality,” Cumulative
 42 Effects,” “Mitigation and Monitoring – Other Regulatory and Permitting Agencies,” and “Conclusion
 43 of Mitigation Effectiveness”).

1 Because the project area would have limited parking available during construction, Rosemont Copper
2 has modified the premining phase traffic plan for worker commutes. The DEIS analyzed mine related
3 traffic, including worker commutes, and assumed that up to 75 percent of worker commutes would
4 carpool in 5-person vans for year 1 of the premining phase. The revised premining worker commute
5 plan would transport construction workers in up to 37 buses per day. The buses would mostly
6 emanate from the Tucson area northwest of the project area, but a few buses would emanate from the
7 Sonoita area south of the project area. Traffic analysis during the active mining phase uses a no-
8 carpool scenario for analyzing mine related traffic impacts (see the “Traffic Safety” part of this
9 resource section). Although a carpooling mitigation measure for the active mining phase is not
10 included in the analysis, Rosemont Copper maintains the position that it would continue to develop a
11 carpooling plan and encourage its employees to participate.

12 **Issues, Cause and Effect Relationships of Concern**

13 Mine operations necessarily impose commercial and commuter traffic on roadways, the use of
14 hazardous materials and explosives, and landscape modifications, which can cause additional risks to
15 the general public by affecting roadways, air quality, and noise levels and by changing geological
16 conditions.

17 One significant issue was identified during scoping concerning public safety.

18 ***Issue 10: Impact on Public Safety***


19 This issue focuses on the hazardous materials that would be transported and the potential increase in
20 the risk of a spill or other public safety impact. Furthermore, an increase in traffic could reduce public
21 safety by increasing the potential for traffic accidents. Another aspect of this issue is human health
22 risks to forest visitors if they inadvertently come into contact with mine operations, tailings facilities,
23 or waste rock facilities. Air quality impacts resulting from the operation could potentially be harmful
24 to public health.

25 **Issue 10 Factors for Alternative Comparison**

- 26 1. Qualitative assessment of public health risk from mine operations and facilities
- 27 2. Qualitative assessment of public health risk from geological hazards
- 28 3. Qualitative assessment of public health risk from noise and vibration
- 29 4. Quantitative assessment of ability to meet air quality standards for human health
- 30 5. Quantitative assessment of the potential change in traffic accidents
- 31 6. Trip count per day for all hazardous materials and qualitative assessment of potential effects
- 32 7. Qualitative assessment of impacts on local emergency response to accidents or spills on
33 public roadways

34 **Analysis Methodology, Assumptions,** 35 **Uncertain and Unknown Information**

36 The analysis for public health and safety is intended to encompass the temporal and spatial extent
37 necessary to describe the public health and safety hazards that may be associated with the proposed
38 project. The temporal bounds of analysis for public health and safety includes the premining, active
39 mining, and final reclamation and closure phases. The analysis area encompasses the project area and
40 the segment of SR 83 between I-10 and the primary access road, which is the planned transportation
41 route for the majority of mine-bound traffic, including all hazardous materials shipments (figure 108).



1

2 **Figure 108. Analysis area for public health and safety**

1 The analysis area also includes a buffer of 1 mile along SR 83, to reflect the likely potential area of
 2 evacuation in case of any traffic accident involving explosives, and at least a 2-mile radius around
 3 perimeter fence locations, to reflect the potential area of effects from an onsite incident involving
 4 ammonium nitrate. Offsite utility corridors were not considered in the analysis area, as impacts on
 5 public health and safety were considered negligible in those areas; however, the analysis area extends
 6 to the Sahuarita area due to the potential for land subsidence to occur because of ongoing and future
 7 groundwater depletion in this area.

8 Existing conditions in the project area related to public health and safety are primarily a result of the
 9 natural and physical environment (e.g., desert and mountainous topography) and current and previous
 10 public use activities (e.g., adits and tunnels from previous mining activities). Impacts to public health
 11 and safety are assessed as follows:

- 12 • Traffic safety is assessed by modeling the change in traffic volume on SR 83 between I-10
 13 and the primary access road and by a quantitative assessment of potential traffic conflicts.
- 14 • Risks to public safety from the storage, use, and transportation of hazardous materials are
 15 assessed by trip counts and mode of transportation for all hazardous materials and by
 16 estimating the likely effects in the event of explosion, fire, or accident. The impact of these
 17 types of events is impossible to detail without knowing the exact conditions. Therefore, the
 18 potential effects of certain hazardous materials in “worst-case” scenarios are also presented,
 19 based primarily on case studies of similar incidents.
- 20 • Risks of mine operations and facilities to the general public and recreation users are assessed
 21 qualitatively, based on the types and locations of hazards; the potential for geological hazards
 22 to occur; and the potential for noise to be immediately hazardous to the public.
- 23 • Air quality impacts are assessed based on air quality modeling and the ability to meet
 24 numeric air quality standards for acute and chronic exposure.

25 **Summary of Effects by Issue Factor by Alternative**

26 Table 192 presents the summary comparison of impacts from each alternative.

27 **Table 192. Summary of effects**

Issue Factor	No Action	Proposed Action	Phased Tailings	Barrel	Barrel Trail	Scholefield-McCleary
Issue 10.1: Qualitative assessment of public health risk from mine operations and facilities	None	None; public is excluded from mine operations and facilities by perimeter fence	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action

Issue Factor	No Action	Proposed Action	Phased Tailings	Barrel	Barrel Trail	Scholefield-McCleary
Issue 10.2: Qualitative assessment of public health risk from geological hazards	No change resulting from proposed mine. Continued ground water pumping in the Santa Cruz Valley resulting from population increases could result in subsidence.	Geological hazards are unlikely, with the exception of land subsidence in the Santa Cruz valley, which could be marginally increased by mine supply pumping	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action
Issue 10.3: Qualitative assessment of public health risk from noise and vibration	None	Acute noise hazards from construction, traffic, equipment, or blasting are unlikely	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action
Issue 10.4: Quantitative assessment of ability to meet air quality standards for human health	No change resulting from proposed mine. Increased traffic and emissions related to population growth would occur.	NAAQS are met at the perimeter fenceline	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action	NAAQS are not met at the perimeter fenceline	NAAQS are not met at the perimeter fenceline
Issue 10.5: Quantitative assessment of the potential change in traffic accidents	Increase in anticipated traffic accidents owing to increased traffic from population growth.	A potential increase of 9 to 14 additional traffic accidents per year on SR 83 during the year with the highest projected traffic volume: active mining phase year 1*	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action

Chapter 3. Affected Environment and Environmental Consequences

Issue Factor	No Action	Proposed Action	Phased Tailings	Barrel	Barrel Trail	Scholefield-McCleary
<p>Issue 10.6: Trip count per day for all hazardous materials and qualitative assessment of potential effects</p>	<p>None</p>	<p>Up to 157 weekly trips for all hazardous materials shipments. Direct impacts primarily from potential release of petroleum products, ammonium nitrate, or sulfuric acid, but risk of accidental release is low. If occurring, onsite ammonium nitrate explosion could cause damage up to 2 miles away and release a plume of toxic gases. Onsite petroleum product fire or sulfuric acid release could cause a plume of smoke and/or toxic gases. Accident during transportation could affect a radius of up to 0.5 mile for sulfuric acid, fuels, and ammonium nitrate and a radius of up to 1 mile for explosives.</p>	<p>Same as for proposed action</p>	<p>94 weekly trips for all hazardous materials shipments (63 fewer than proposed action as a result of removal of heap leach and oxide plant facilities)</p>	<p>Same as for proposed action</p>	<p>Same as for proposed action</p>

Issue Factor	No Action	Proposed Action	Phased Tailings	Barrel	Barrel Trail	Scholefield-McCleary
Issue 10.7: Qualitative assessment of impacts on local emergency response to accidents or spills on public roadways	No change resulting from proposed mine. Increased development associated with population growth could result in more shipments of hazardous materials, which could result in accidents or spills that require emergency response.	Increased potential of hazardous materials accidents or spills on public roadways and therefore potential increased frequency for emergency responses	Same as for proposed action	Less than other action alternatives due to reduced hazardous materials shipments	Same as for proposed action	Same as for proposed action

1 * It is important to understand that traffic accidents are the result of numerous variables that cannot be predicted with any
 2 certainty; therefore, these projections provide a simple mathematical extrapolation and should be taken as such.

3 **Affected Environment**

4 **Relevant Laws, Regulations, Policies, and Plans**

5 ***Federal***

6 Regulations specific to noise, air, recreation, transportation, and hazardous materials are detailed in
 7 those respective sections. The following laws and regulations are specific to public health and safety.

8 The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. 11001–11050)
 9 requires the private sector to inventory chemicals and chemical products, report those in excess of
 10 threshold planning quantities, inventory emergency response equipment, provide annual reports and
 11 support to local and State emergency response organizations, and maintain a liaison with the local and
 12 State emergency response organizations and the public.

13 Under ARS 49-99, 49-929, and 49-930, the State refers to the requirements to establish a hazardous
 14 waste program equivalent to and consistent with the Federal hazardous waste program promulgated
 15 under subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. This subtitle establishes
 16 requirements for the generation, storage, handling, transport, and disposal of hazardous waste.

17 Title 30 CFR Part 62 Section 100 sets forth mandatory health standards for each surface and
 18 underground metal, nonmetal, and coal mine subject to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
 19 1977. The provisions of Part 62 became effective on September 13, 2000. Also, 30 CFR 56 provides
 20 further safety and health standards specific to surface metal and nonmetal mine operations.

21 The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 13101–13109) encourages and requires prevention
 22 and reduction of waste streams and other pollution through minimization, process change, and
 23 recycling. It encourages and requires development of new technology and markets to meet the
 24 objectives.

1 **Existing Conditions**

2 Public health and safety hazards already exist in the project area as a result of the natural and physical
3 environment and current and previous public use activities. The existing conditions are categorized
4 into six types of hazards to public health and safety: geological hazards, transportation and use of
5 hazardous materials, noise, air quality, recreation hazards, and traffic safety.

6 ***Geological Hazards***

7 Geological hazards generally include natural occurrences such as seismic activity, ground subsidence,
8 and fissures. These geological factors need to be taken into consideration with regard to development
9 in the area, in particular with respect to engineered structures. Ground subsidence and fissures are the
10 most likely to be potential safety issues. These hazards would occur in the vicinity of the mine water
11 supply pumping in Sahuarita, rather than within the project area.

12 **Seismic Faults**

13 A full discussion of seismic activity in the analysis area is found in the “Geology, Minerals, and
14 Paleontology” resource section of this chapter. Potentially active faults that could generate
15 earthquakes of magnitude 6.5 to 7.2 are scattered throughout southeastern and central Arizona.
16 Earthquakes of this magnitude are considered strong to major events, with serious damage possible
17 over a wide area. All of the potentially active faults in the Phoenix and Tucson areas have low slip
18 rates and long intervals between ruptures and have had little historic activity. Because of this, the
19 AGS places these areas in the low to moderate hazard category. Tetra Tech (2007) completed a
20 regional seismological assessment, and the results indicate that 27 active faults lie within a 200-
21 kilometer target radius surrounding the project area.

22 **Subsidence**

23 A full discussion of ground subsidence in the analysis area is found in both the “Geology, Minerals,
24 and Paleontology” resource section and the “Groundwater Quantity” resource section. Land
25 subsidence is the lowering of the land surface due to changes that take place underground.
26 The common causes of land subsidence from human activity are pumping water, oil, and gas from
27 underground pore spaces; dissolution of limestone aquifers, causing sinkholes; collapse of
28 underground mines; drainage of organic soils; and hydrocompaction caused by initial wetting of dry
29 soils. Most subsidence in Arizona occurs as a result of compaction of alluvial materials due to
30 withdrawal of groundwater from the pore spaces of underground aquifers. Assessment of geological
31 hazards indicated little risk of subsidence from historic mining operations or karst geology (Tetra
32 Tech 2007). Land subsidence due to groundwater withdrawal has been recorded in the Green Valley
33 area of the Santa Cruz Valley (Carruth et al. 2007). A more detailed discussion of subsidence impacts
34 from groundwater withdrawal is included in the “Groundwater Quantity” resource section of
35 chapter 3.

36 ***Use and Transportation of Hazardous Materials***

37 Hazardous materials, when released uncontrolled into the environment, can impact public safety.
38 Direct exposure to hazardous materials can result in significant immediate health hazards; indirect
39 exposure, such as contamination to groundwater or surface water, can result in long-term health
40 hazards, or impairment or destruction of natural resources used by the public. SR 83 and I-10
41 currently facilitate the transportation of hazardous materials to businesses and industries. All
42 hazardous materials deliveries must be made in accordance with the requirements outlined in 49 ARS.

1 Further details of hazardous materials use, transportation, storage, and disposal are included in the
2 “Hazardous Materials” resource section.

3 Although the project area has been used historically for various activities, including mining, overall,
4 the natural condition of the project area is relatively intact. Current infrastructure in the project area
5 includes unpaved roads, wells, and utility lines to support existing ranching and recreation uses.
6 Structures are sparse; there is a ranch house and maintenance area, stock tanks, groundwater wells,
7 and fencing. Past mining activity has left behind mine shafts, mine adits, a smelter slag pile, and a
8 masonry leaching tank on the west side of the Rosemont Ranch property (Ezzo et al. 2011).
9 The disposition of historic mine workings is focused solely on safely closing and securing access to
10 sites; no reclamation from hazardous materials is expected to be necessary (Sturgess 2007).

11 **Noise**

12 Increasing noise levels can lead to nonauditory effects, speech interference, and sleep interference.
13 Nonauditory effects can include hypertension and changes in blood pressure and heart rate. In 1974,
14 the EPA identified noise levels that could be used to protect public health and welfare, including
15 prevention of hearing damage, sleep disturbance, and communication disruption. Any anticipated
16 increase in noise levels in the project area would result from activities associated with the
17 construction or operation of the open-pit mine.

18 Some areas have been identified as potential noise-sensitive receptors in the vicinity of the proposed
19 Rosemont Copper Mine. Eight residences are located northeast of the project area along SR 83 in the
20 Mulberry Canyon area, approximately 6 to 7 miles from the center of the proposed open-pit mine.
21 Six residences are located southeast of the project area along Singing Valley Road, approximately
22 3 to 4 miles from the center of the proposed open-pit mine. Nine additional rural residences are
23 located southeast of the project area, approximately 5 to 6 miles from the center of the open-pit mine,
24 scattered along SR 83, East Greaterville Road, Old Sonoita Highway, Beatty Ranch Road, and
25 Singing Hills Trail. The Santa Rita Abbey is located along East Fish Canyon Road, 7.3 miles from the
26 center of the proposed open-pit mine.

27 Background noise data collected from 10 locations in the vicinity of the project area in May 2008
28 demonstrate the low ambient noise conditions typical of areas with limited development and few
29 major roadways. Most of these monitoring locations showed a similar overall noise level range, with
30 minimum noise levels of approximately 31 to 35 dBA and maximum noise levels of about 71 to 77
31 dBA. Full details of ambient noise conditions are provided in the “Noise” resource section.

32 **Air Quality**

33 Air quality is regulated for two general classes of pollutants: criteria pollutants and hazardous air
34 pollutants. Criteria pollutants are those pollutants for which NAAQS have been established in order to
35 protect public health. These include CO, NO₂, O₃, PM_{2.5} and PM₁₀, SO₂, and Pb. Hazardous air
36 pollutants consist of almost 200 toxic compounds that have been shown to cause or possibly cause
37 cancer in humans or that may cause adverse environmental and ecological effects.

38 Ambient air quality monitoring for PM₁₀ has been conducted in the project area since 2006; ambient
39 monitoring for all other criteria pollutants has been conducted in Pima County but not specifically in
40 the project area. Ambient concentrations of PM₁₀ in the project area are well below the NAAQS.
41 Ambient concentrations of all other criteria pollutants are expected to be well below the NAAQS,
42 based on monitoring conducted in Pima County. Ambient concentrations of hazardous air pollutants

1 are also expected to be low. Further details of expected concentrations of hazardous air pollutants,
2 along with a complete list of hazardous air pollutants, are included in the “Air Quality and Climate
3 Change” resource section of chapter 3.

4 ***Recreation Hazards***

5 The project area consists of hundreds of acres of mostly natural terrain—areas that are typically
6 exposed to off-highway vehicle traffic on the roadways, campers, day-users, and hikers. A number of
7 developed and semideveloped campgrounds, picnic areas, day-use areas, trailheads, roads, and trails
8 exist for recreation use in the area (note: no campgrounds or picnic areas exist in the analysis area).
9 Off-highway vehicle use can pose potential safety concerns for those using the vehicles or bystanders.
10 Off-highway vehicle traffic can also contribute to potential air quality issues in the immediate area of
11 use as a result of increased particulate matter, particularly O₃ and PM₁₀. Further details of recreation
12 conditions are included in the “Recreation and Wilderness” resource section of chapter 3.

13 ***Traffic Safety***

14 **State Route 83**

15 SR 83 is a two-lane state scenic highway in southern Arizona, stretching from its junction with
16 I-10 near Vail south to Parker Canyon Lake. It passes through sparsely populated areas of Pima,
17 Santa Cruz, and Cochise Counties, traversing the town of Sonoita. SR 83 has few school bus pullouts.
18 Roadway safety improvements were recently completed in 2011 within that segment of highway.
19 The primary access road would intersect SR 83 at milepost 46.9.

20 Further details of SR 83 traffic conditions are included in the “Transportation/Access” resource
21 section in chapter 3. With respect to the analysis of public health and safety, two criteria are useful in
22 assessing future conditions: accident history, and current traffic counts and level of service.

23 ***Annual Accidents along State Route 83***

24 Based on analysis of accident frequency and accident rate, the top accident-prone locations were
25 identified to be mileposts 44 through 46, 55, and 58. The proposed primary access road for the project
26 is located at milepost 46.9. The analysis shows that this location has a relatively low accident
27 frequency and rate. At mileposts 44 and 45, there was a significantly higher accident frequency,
28 compared with the rest of SR 83. Of the total accidents that occur along SR 83, 26 percent were at
29 milepost 44. The analysis showed that the roadway between mileposts 44 and 46 had tighter
30 horizontal curves, which have been at least partially addressed by an ADOT safety improvement
31 reconstruction completed in 2011. Roadway geometry has an influence on accident frequency.

32 Of the total accidents on SR 83 between 2003 and 2008, approximately 49 percent were associated
33 with passenger cars and 30 percent were associated with motorcycles. Accidents involving semi-
34 trucks showed a relatively low value, at approximately 3.8 percent. School bus accidents accounted
35 for 0.54 percent of the total accidents. At milepost 44, the most common accident vehicle type was a
36 motorcycle, and speeding was the documented major accident cause. Motorcycles accounted for
37 69 percent of the accident vehicles at milepost 44, and passenger cars accounted for 19 percent. Of all
38 the major causes of accidents along SR 83, speeding was the major documented cause, accounting for
39 51 percent of the total accidents. Approximately 23 percent of documented accidents were not the
40 result of improper driving, meaning that the driver’s behavior was not the main cause of the accident;
41 this often indicates possible problems with roadway geometry.

1 Of the accidents that occurred on SR 83 between 2003 and 2008, 47 percent resulted in no injury and
 2 24 percent resulted in non-incapacitating injuries. There were three fatal accidents at milepost 44,
 3 accounting for 1.6 percent of the total accidents.

4 Since the publication of the DEIS, ADOT has provided data regarding accidents on SR 83 between
 5 I-10 and SR 82 for the 5-year period between 2007 and 2011 (Psomas 2012). These data indicate that
 6 roughly 32 accidents per year occur on SR 83. The majority of accidents occurred between mileposts
 7 44 and 46. Since ADOT completed roadway safety improvements between mileposts 44 and 46 in
 8 2010, there has been a steady decrease in the number of accidents at this location and on SR 83 in
 9 general. Two fatal accidents occurred on SR 83 between SR 82 and I-10, the equivalent of 0.4 fatal
 10 accident per year. Information on the cause of accidents and type of vehicles involved was not
 11 included with the updated data.

12 **Traffic Counts**

13 Table 193 shows traffic counts conducted for SR 83 in 2012, by time of day, on weekdays and
 14 weekends, during peak (March/April) and nonpeak (June /July) seasons, and by peak direction and
 15 nonpeak direction (Psomas 2012). As shown in table 193, the highest total daily traffic counts occur
 16 on weekends during the peak season and, more specifically, during the a.m. and p.m. peak hours
 17 during the peak season.

18 **Table 193. Baseline traffic counts for SR 83**

		Daily Total	A.M. Peak Hour Volumes			P.M. Peak Hour Volumes		
			Total	Peak Direction	Nonpeak Direction	Total	Peak Direction	Nonpeak Direction
Peak Season	Weekday	2,242	166	90	76	219	115	104
	Weekend	2,690	199	108	91	263	138	125
Nonpeak Season	Weekday	1,875	139	76	63	183	96	87
	Weekend	2,250	167	91	76	220	116	104

19 **Environmental Consequences**

20 **Direct and Indirect Effects of Each Alternative**

21 **No Action Alternative**

22 Under the no action alternative, the project area would remain in its present condition with respect to
 23 public health and safety. SR 83 and I-10 would continue to facilitate the transportation of hazardous
 24 materials to businesses and industries. Population growth in southern Arizona would continue to
 25 increase traffic on highways, which could subsequently affect transportation safety.

26 **Impacts Common to All Action Alternatives**

27 The proposed action and all other action alternatives are identical with respect to geological and
 28 recreation hazards and impacts to public health and safety from noise.

29 **Recreation Hazards**

30 Impacts to public health and safety from recreation hazards result from exposure of the recreating
 31 public to mine operations or unsafe terrain or conditions and are qualitatively assessed based on the
 32 types and locations of hazards. According to the preliminary MPO (WestLand Resources Inc. 2007),
 33 a perimeter fence would be erected to minimize and discourage any access by the recreating public to

1 the operational areas of the mine itself and would prevent any interaction with mine equipment,
2 unsafe terrain, air quality exceedances, or unsafe conditions. Restricted access would be indicated by
3 signage along the fence and enforced by security patrols. This would minimize and discourage any
4 contact of the recreating public with mine related hazards. Direct effects on public health and safety
5 associated with recreation in the project area are unlikely.

6 **Geological Hazards**

7 *Effect of Subsidence*

8 Subsidence risk is solely related to the withdrawal of groundwater in Green Valley for the mine water
9 supply. Hydrologic modeling shows that groundwater declines as great as 90 feet are expected to
10 occur, based on pumping estimates for the mine water supply. This pumping has the potential to
11 increase or exacerbate ongoing subsidence in the area.

12 Land subsidence caused by groundwater withdrawal is rarely catastrophic but rather is an extended
13 ongoing process, although existing fissures have been known to open rapidly or grow during heavy
14 rains. As such, fissures generally are more of a risk to property than to public health and safety. There
15 may be direct effects on public health and safety associated with land subsidence as a result of an
16 increase in groundwater pumping, depending on the location and magnitude of the fissures.

17 *Effect of Seismic Activity*

18 A geological hazard analysis (Tetra Tech 2007) was conducted in order to guide the design of the
19 waste rock and tailings facilities, and a separate study was conducted to analyze the stability of the pit
20 (Pratt and Nicholas 2009). Both facilities have been designed to meet or exceed factor-of-stability
21 values for both seismic and static stability that are required under ADEQ regulations. Stability
22 analysis of the tailings and waste rock facilities is discussed in the “Soils and Revegetation” resource
23 section in chapter 3. Stability analysis of the mine pit is discussed in the “Geology, Minerals, and
24 Paleontology” resource section in chapter 3.

25 **Noise**

26 Impacts to public health and safety from noise could arise from traffic noise, blasting noise, or
27 construction or operational noise and are only associated with acute exposure where immediate
28 hearing damage or loss might occur. Impacts are assessed by comparing modeled noise levels with
29 regulatory limits. Modeled noise levels were obtained from a series of technical reports (Sculley
30 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e; Tetra Tech 2009). Noise impacts are discussed in detail in the
31 “Noise” resource section.

32 Noise exposure as regulated under the MSHA or Occupational Safety and Health Administration is
33 typically based on the average exposure over a period of time. The Occupational Safety and Health
34 Administration regulatory limit over 8 hours is 80 dBA; while not necessarily applicable to the
35 general public, this threshold has been used to conservatively assess the potential for impacts to
36 public health and safety resulting from noise.

37 *Effects of Traffic Noise*

38 Modeling indicates that any noise in excess of 55 dBA from traffic is unlikely to exist beyond the
39 immediate vicinity of the transportation routes and would not exceed the health and safety threshold
40 of 80 dBA. Direct effects on public health and safety associated with traffic noise are unlikely.

Effects of Blasting Noise

Noise from blasting attenuates with distance, as does all noise. Members of the general public could be present on NFS land near the mine and be exposed to blasting noise. Noise levels exceeding the threshold of 80 dBA would occur in the project area within 1 mile of the blast site. However, more than 1 mile away from the blast site, noise levels would not exceed the threshold of 80 dBA. Modeling indicates that at 1.5 miles from the blast site, noise levels are unlikely to exceed the maximum ambient noise levels observed in the project area. Direct effects on public health and safety associated with blasting noise are unlikely.

Effects of Construction and Operational Noise

Modeling indicates that any noise in excess of 60 dBA from construction and operation is unlikely to exist outside the project boundaries and would not exceed the health and safety threshold of 80 dBA. Direct effects on public health and safety associated with construction and operational noise are unlikely.

Public Safety after Closure

The intent of the Coronado is to return the project area to multiple-use management to the extent feasible after final closure, including grazing management and recreational use. To that end, it is anticipated that the perimeter and security fences would be removed (other than sections that may be used for grazing management purposes) to reopen the area to public access and that areas of the pit that may be unsafe would be fenced or barricaded. It is important to note, however, that decisions about what areas to open to public access, recreational use, livestock grazing, and other uses would be made by the Coronado at the time of final closure, when the actual conditions of the project area are known. Areas that are deemed unsafe or inappropriate for certain uses may continue to be fenced, barricaded, or otherwise closed to those uses. Uses may be restricted for a period of time beyond mine closure if final reclamation objectives, such as revegetation, have not been achieved. Public safety would be a primary consideration in decisions made by the Coronado regarding postclosure use of the project area.

Proposed Action and Action Alternatives

Since the publication of the DEIS, the Barrel Alternative has been modified to eliminate the heap leach and oxide ore processing facilities (see chapter 2). Therefore, use and transportation of hazardous materials would differ under the Barrel Alternative, compared with the other action alternatives.

Traffic Safety

Traffic safety is a concern primarily along SR 83 between the primary access road and I-10, which would be the main transportation route for personnel and materials deliveries, and a potential—and likely—route for out-hauled product from the mine. Therefore, impacts from mine traffic are focused on this segment of SR 83. Impacts to traffic safety are assessed in terms of traffic type and volume based on traffic modeling on SR 83 and extrapolation of those modeling results to accidents and fatalities. Qualitative assessments of traffic impacts were conducted using modeled “level of service” ratings. For a detailed analysis of the impacts to level of service on SR 83 between I-10 and SR 82, see the “Transportation/Access” resource section in chapter 3.

Effects on Traffic Volume—Premining Phase

Premining phase traffic would have a direct impact on SR 83 by increasing traffic volume on SR 83 between the primary access road and I-10. The daily traffic increase during year 1 of the premining phase would be 37 buses for worker commutes, 4 heavy loads, and 50 daily deliveries/semi-truck loads on SR 83 (Psomas 2012). Table 194 below shows projected traffic during year 1 of the premining phase by time of day, on weekdays and weekends, during peak (March/April) and nonpeak (June /July) seasons, and by peak direction and nonpeak direction. The projections include growth in baseline traffic based on traffic projections from ADOT.

Table 194. Traffic volume – premining phase year 1

		Daily Total	A.M. Peak Hour Volumes			P.M. Peak Hour Volumes		
			Total	Peak Direction	Nonpeak Direction	Total	Peak Direction	Nonpeak Direction
Peak Season	Weekday	2,520	210	127	84	294	153	140
	Weekend	2,892	232	136	96	319	166	153
Nonpeak Season	Weekday	2,144	182	111	71	257	134	123
	Weekend	2,441	199	118	81	275	143	132

Source: Psomas (2012).

As tables 192 and 194 show, the peak season weekend a.m. and p.m. peak hours have the highest total traffic counts for both the current existing conditions and traffic that would occur during year 1 of the premining phase. The addition of mine related traffic during year 1 of the premining phase and projected traffic volume increases due to population growth would account for a 17 percent increase over current volumes during peak season weekend a.m. peak hour volumes (199 existing/232 projected) and 21 percent increase in traffic during peak season weekend p.m. peak hour volumes (263 existing/319 projected). Total mine related traffic during the premining phase would be up to approximately 182 one-way daily trips of all vehicle types (worker commutes, heavy loads, and semi-truck loads). Therefore, mine related traffic would constitute between 6 to 8 percent of the total daily traffic on SR 83 during year 1 of the premining phase.

In order to reduce the risk of under-representing potential traffic projections, these projections assume that all premining project related traffic would travel from north of the project area using SR 83 between the primary access road and I-10, that 35 worker bus commutes would occur during the peak a.m. and p.m. hours using SR 83 between the primary access road and I-10, and that heavy load and semi-truck loads would not avoid a.m. and p.m. peak hours (Psomas 2012). Variations in traffic point of origin would spread a small amount of projected traffic volume to SR 83 from the primary access road southward to its intersection with SR 82. Worker bus commutes, heavy loads, and daily semi-truck loads that would occur during nonpeak a.m. and p.m. hours would spread the projected traffic volume more evenly across time.

Effects on Traffic Volume—Active Mining Phase

Mine operations would also have a direct effect on traffic volume during the active mining phase. Year 1 of the active mining phase for all alternatives would have the highest projection of mine related traffic and is therefore analyzed here to show the highest potential impact to traffic volume. Daily mine traffic during year 1 of active mining would consist of up to 56 copper concentrate shipments (50 under the Barrel Alternative), 4 copper cathode shipments (0 under the Barrel Alternative), 9 sulfuric acid shipments (0 under the Barrel Alternative), and 19 other materials

1 shipments (Psomas 2012). Worker commutes during weekdays would account for up to
 2 284 daily commutes (up to 311 for the Barrel Alternative). The assumption for the analysis is that 85
 3 percent of the working commute would travel on SR 83 between the primary access road and I-10.
 4 Weekends would have 40 fewer daily worker commutes than weekdays because office staff would not
 5 be working on the weekends. Worker commute carpooling was not analyzed for the active mining
 6 phase. Table 195 below shows projected traffic for all action alternatives except Barrel Alternative
 7 during year 1 of the active mining phase by time of day, on weekdays and weekends, during peak
 8 (March/April) and nonpeak (June /July) seasons, and by peak direction and nonpeak direction. Table
 9 196 below shows these traffic projections for the Barrel Alternative. The projections include growth
 10 in baseline traffic based on traffic projections from ADOT.

11 **Table 195. Proposed action, Phased Tailings, Barrel Trail, and Scholefield Alternatives – traffic**
 12 **volume active mining phase year 1**

		Daily Total	A.M. Peak Hour Volumes			P.M. Peak Hour Volumes		
			Total	Peak Direction	Nonpeak Direction	Total	Peak Direction	Nonpeak Direction
Peak Season	Weekday	3,067	429	274	155	486	300	186
	Weekend	3,453	429	257	172	497	289	208
Nonpeak Season	Weekday	2,673	400	258	142	447	280	167
	Weekend	2,980	393	238	156	451	265	186

13 Source: Psomas (2012).

14 **Table 196. Barrel Alternative – traffic volume active mining phase year 1**

		Daily Total	A.M. Peak Hour Volumes			P.M. Peak Hour Volumes		
			Total	Peak Direction	Nonpeak Direction	Total	Peak Direction	Nonpeak Direction
Peak Season	Weekday	3,075	450	285	165	507	312	195
	Weekend	3,460	446	265	181	515	297	217
Nonpeak Season	Weekday	2,681	421	269	151	468	292	177
	Weekend	2,987	411	246	165	468	273	195

15 Source: Psomas (2012).

16 As tables 195 and 196 above show, the peak season weekday and weekend p.m. peak hours would
 17 have the highest total traffic counts during year 1 of the active mining phase. The Barrel Alternative
 18 would have a slightly higher traffic volume than the other action alternatives (between 17 and 21
 19 additional vehicles). Based on the Barrel Alternative traffic projections, the addition of mine related
 20 traffic during year 1 of the active mining phase and projected traffic volume increases due to
 21 population growth would account for a 124 percent increase over current volumes during peak season
 22 weekend a.m. peak hour volumes (199 existing/446 projected), a 96 percent increase in traffic during
 23 peak season weekend p.m. peak hour volumes (263 existing/515 projected), and a 171 percent
 24 increase in traffic during peak season weekday a.m. peak hour volumes (166 existing/450 projected).
 25 The other action alternatives would contribute to a slightly less percent increase in total traffic volume
 26 (between 89 and 158 percent). Total mine related traffic during year 1 of the active mining phase for
 27 the Barrel Alternative would be up to approximately 760 one-way daily trips (744 for the other action
 28 alternatives) of all vehicle types (haul trucks, deliveries, and worker commutes). Therefore, mine
 29 related traffic would constitute between 22 and 28 percent of the total daily traffic on SR 83 during
 30 year 1 of the active mining phase.

1 In order to reduce the risk of under-representing potential traffic projections, the projections assume
2 that all mine related truck shipments to and from the mine would travel between the primary access
3 road and I-10, that all worker commutes would occur during the peak a.m. and p.m. hours, and that
4 heavy load and semi-truck loads would not avoid a.m. and p.m. peak hours. Variations in traffic point
5 of origin would spread a small amount of projected traffic volume to SR 83 from the primary access
6 road southward to its intersection with SR 82. Worker commutes and daily semi-truck loads that
7 would occur during nonpeak a.m. and p.m. hours would spread the projected traffic volume more
8 evenly across time. Additional information on projected traffic volumes and other roadways is
9 available in the “Transportation/Access” resource section in this chapter and in the “Updated
10 Rosemont Traffic Impact Analysis” (Psomas 2012).

11 ***Potential Accidents and Fatalities***

12 ADOT provided data regarding vehicle accidents on SR 83 between I-10 and SR 82 for the 5-year
13 period between 2007 and 2011. Based on these data, roughly 32 accidents per year occur on SR 83.
14 The majority of accidents occurred between mileposts 44 and 46. Since ADOT completed roadway
15 safety improvements between mileposts 44 and 46 in 2010, there has been a steady decrease in the
16 number of crashes at this location and SR 83 in general. Two fatal accidents occurred on SR 83
17 between SR 82 and I-10 during the period from 2007 to 2011, the equivalent of 0.4 fatal accidents per
18 year.

19 Including traffic increases due to population growth and project traffic, total traffic on SR 83 is
20 projected to increase from 8 to 14 percent during the premining phase and from 28 to 43 percent
21 during year 1 of the active mining phase for all action alternatives (Psomas 2012). Assuming the same
22 accident rates, based on projected increases in all traffic vehicle types (population growth as well as
23 mine related), in year 1 (the year with the highest increase in traffic volume), approximately 41 to 46
24 accidents per year could potentially occur on SR 83, with fatalities potentially occurring between 0.51
25 and 0.57 times per year. It is important to understand that traffic accidents and fatalities are the result
26 of numerous variables that cannot be predicted with any certainty; therefore, these projections provide
27 a simple mathematical extrapolation and should not be taken as a prediction made with any certainty.

28 ***Use and Transportation of Hazardous Materials***

29 All hazardous materials and petroleum products would be transported to and from the project area by
30 commercial trucks in accordance with 49 CFR and 28 ARS. The main transportation route for these
31 hazardous materials into and out of the project area would be along I-10 and SR 83. Impacts to public
32 health and safety from transportation of hazardous materials are assessed based on the daily trip count
33 for all hazardous materials.

34 All hazardous materials for the project are delivered to, stored, and used within the mine site.
35 The majority of these hazardous materials, even in the event of an accident at the mine site, represent
36 no threat to public health and safety beyond the mine site. Impacts to public health and safety are
37 assessed qualitatively for three hazardous materials: ammonium nitrate, petroleum products (gasoline,
38 diesel fuel, kerosene), and sulfuric acid. For the purposes of this analysis, several scenarios are
39 qualitatively considered, based on similar case studies.

40 The Barrel Alternative has been modified to eliminate the heap leach and oxide ore processing
41 facilities. This modification would reduce the number of hazardous materials round trips by 63 per
42 week because sulfuric acid would no longer be required. Kerosene would also no longer be necessary;
43 however, kerosene deliveries are included in the aggregate of fuels and oils deliveries, which

1 constitute less than one trip per week and therefore would not significantly decrease hazardous
2 materials trips.

3 ***Effects of Onsite Storage of Ammonium Nitrate***

4 Ammonium nitrate is a strong oxidizer and is useful as a blasting agent when combined in an
5 ammonium nitrate and fuel oil mixture. Both products are stable when separately stored under proper
6 conditions. The primary risk from onsite storage of ammonium nitrate is the risk of explosion under
7 certain temperature and pressure conditions or contact with combustible materials. Ammonium nitrate
8 would be stored onsite in three 75-ton storage silos, for a maximum storage of 225 tons.

9 There are numerous case studies of ammonium nitrate explosions; worldwide, at least eight
10 ammonium nitrate explosions have been widely reported in the past decade. In general, it is quite
11 difficult to make pure-form ammonium nitrate explode, even when it is exposed to fire. Many
12 incidents involved transportation of small amounts of ammonium nitrate (<25 tons) by ship, truck,
13 or train; these explosions were mainly caused by unrelated accidents and the resulting fire and
14 confinement. Fewer incidents involved storage or handling of ammonium nitrate. In 2001, an
15 explosion in the AZF fertilizer factory in Toulouse, France, involved 200 to 300 tons of ammonium
16 nitrate, approximately the same amount to be stored at the Rosemont Copper Mine. In addition to
17 deaths and injuries in the immediate vicinity, property damage occurred up to 2 miles away. However,
18 these events are exceedingly rare, given how extensive the use of ammonium nitrate is around the
19 world.

20 The decomposition of ammonium nitrate during a fire or explosion also results in the release of toxic
21 gases, namely, ammonia and NO_x. Release of these gases during a fire at the storage silos would most
22 likely result in plume movement to the east, with prevailing winds, although winds are variable in the
23 project area. A similar event occurred in 2009 in Bryan, Texas, forcing the downwind evacuation of
24 80,000 people.

25 Under proper storage conditions, there are unlikely to be direct effects on public health and safety
26 associated with onsite storage of ammonium nitrate. Proper storage conditions are required under
27 Arizona State regulations (AAC R11-1 Article 2), as well as under Federal regulations (30 CFR
28 77.1304). Ensuring proper storage conditions is the responsibility of the mine operator. The Arizona
29 State mine inspector has the charge of inspecting mines for violations and enforcing state law with
30 respect to explosive storage, as does the Federal MSHA. Consideration of incidents of fire or
31 explosion associated with stored ammonium nitrate suggests that an explosive or fire incident
32 involving the ammonium nitrate storage silos is unlikely but could potentially cause significant
33 damage up to 2 miles away and produce large plumes of toxic gases of ammonia and NO_x.

34 ***Effects of Onsite Storage of Petroleum Products***

35 Storage of petroleum products onsite represents a potential risk of fire and explosion. Onsite storage
36 would include one 12,000-gallon tank for kerosene (this would not be included in the Barrel
37 Alternative), four storage tanks for diesel ranging from 10,000 to 100,000 gallons, and one 10,000-
38 gallon tank for gasoline. Hazards from explosion or fire are unlikely to immediately impact anything
39 outside the project area.

1 The use and storage of petroleum products are so ubiquitous that incidents of fire or explosion
2 involving storage of petroleum products are highly variable. In general, blast impacts from
3 gasoline/diesel/kerosene tank explosions likely would not extend beyond the boundaries of the mine;
4 however, the airborne smoke plume would extend beyond the mine. The plume would extend
5 generally to the east, with prevailing winds, although winds are variable in the project area. Airborne
6 byproducts include CO, CO₂, and uncombusted hydrocarbons.

7 Direct effects on public health and safety associated with onsite storage of petroleum products are
8 unlikely. However, in the event of an onsite fire or explosion, hazards are unlikely to immediately
9 impact anything outside the project area.

10 The Barrel Alternative has been modified to not include oxide ore processing facilities in which
11 kerosene is used. Therefore, the Barrel Alternative would not include the 12,000-gallon tank for
12 kerosene storage, and the risks associated with kerosene storage would not occur.

13 ***Effects of Onsite Storage of Sulfuric Acid***

14 For all action alternatives except the Barrel Alternative, storage of sulfuric acid onsite represents
15 potential adverse health effects if released. Onsite storage includes three 900-ton tanks. While
16 representing a hazard through immediate exposure on skin or eyes, a release of sulfuric acid is
17 unlikely to result in exposure by the general public except if airborne. Sulfuric acid is a stable liquid
18 at temperatures below 536°F; however, at high temperatures, it does decompose into toxic gases.
19 Although it is not combustible or flammable, sulfuric acid is reactive and can create high heat when
20 reacting with combustible materials.

21 A simple accident, such as rupture of a storage tank, is unlikely to result in direct effects on public
22 health and safety outside the boundaries of the mine. However, an accident involving exposure of
23 sulfuric acid to fire, or reactive materials, could produce an airborne plume of gas (SO₂ and sulfur
24 trioxide) that would represent a direct, adverse effect on public health and safety.

25 The Barrel Alternative has eliminated the heap leach and oxide ore processing facilities. Therefore, no
26 onsite storage of sulfuric acid would occur under this alternative, and the risks associated with
27 sulfuric acid storage would not occur.

28 ***Effects of Transportation of Hazardous Materials***

29 Transportation of hazardous materials to the project area generates the most risk associated with
30 hazardous materials because of the potential for a traffic accident to cause an accidental release of a
31 hazardous material. The risk can be minimized through adherence to transportation and hazardous
32 material regulations, but it cannot be completely mitigated. The potential would always exist for
33 accidents to occur; in the event of an accidental release, there is the potential for direct, adverse
34 effects on public health and safety.

35 Hazardous materials would be shipped in a wide variety of forms and quantities and would total an
36 estimated 32 trips per day for all action alternatives except the Barrel Alternative. Table 197
37 summarizes methods of shipment, amounts, and potential risks.

1 **Table 197. Estimated frequency of shipments of hazardous materials***

Material	Quantity per Year	Trips per Day	Shipment Method	Potential Risks
Sulfuric acid (tons) (except Barrel Alternative)	160,000	9	Liquid by tanker truck	Immediate contact; toxic gases released at high temperatures
Pebble lime (tons)	37,200	5	Bulk dry by truck	Minimal
Diesel fuel (gallons)	9,000,000	4	Liquid by tanker truck	Explosion and fire
Ammonium nitrate (tons)	20,075	4	Bulk dry by truck	Explosion and fire
Miscellaneous reagents (tons)	3,750	1	Various by truck	Minimal
Wear parts and explosives (tons)	3,250	1	Various by truck	Explosion and fire
Fuels and oils (gallons)	105,000	<1	Liquid by tanker truck	Explosion and fire

2 Source: M3 Engineering and Technology Corporation (2012).

3 * Applies to all action except the Barrel Alternative.

4 Every traffic accident is different, but the potential impacts from a traffic accident involving these
5 compounds can be estimated by examining the emergency response guidelines (Wheat Scharf
6 Associates and ADOT/FHWA/BLM/USFS Steering Committee 2008). Emergency response
7 guidelines include distance guidelines for first responders to first isolate the spill and then protect the
8 public from the spill. These guidelines represent the likely radius of impact in the event of a traffic
9 accident, as follows:

- 10 • Sulfuric acid. For a spill, isolate up to 150 feet away. In the event of a fire, isolate and order
11 evacuations up to 0.5 mile away.
- 12 • Diesel fuel, gasoline, kerosene. For a spill, isolate up to 150 feet away. In the event of a fire,
13 isolate and order evacuations up to 0.5 mile away.
- 14 • Ammonium nitrate. For a spill, isolate up to 150 feet away. In the event of a fire, isolate and
15 order evacuations up to 0.5 mile away.
- 16 • Explosives. For a spill, isolate up to 0.3 mile away, or up to 0.5 mile away for a large spill.
17 In the event of a fire, isolate and order evacuations up to 1 mile away.

18 The Barrel Alternative would not require sulfuric acid and kerosene because it has been modified to
19 eliminate the heap leach and oxide ore processing facilities. Compared with the other action
20 alternatives, the Barrel Alternative would have at least nine fewer round trips per day of hazardous
21 materials shipments because sulfuric acid is no longer required. Kerosene deliveries are included in
22 the aggregate for fuels and oils shipments, which constitute less than one trip per day. Consequently,
23 the risks presented by transporting sulfuric acid and, to a lesser extent, kerosene would not occur
24 under the Barrel Alternative.

25 **Air Quality**

26 Impacts to public health and safety from air quality consist of both acute (immediate danger to life)
27 and chronic exposure and are assessed by comparing modeled air quality with numeric regulatory
28 levels for criteria pollutants and hazardous air pollutants.

29 Air quality modeling was conducted for conditions during the construction and operation phases of
30 the project, both in the project area and at Saguaro National Park East (the nearest Class I airshed).
31 Full details of the modeling are included in the “Air Quality and Climate Change” resource section of
32 chapter 3.

1 Criteria pollutants (CO, NO_x, SO₂, Pb, PM₁₀, and PM_{2.5}) are measured against NAAQS. The air
2 quality model indicates that these standards would not be exceeded outside the perimeter fence line
3 during the active mining phase of the project for three of the action alternatives. The Federal air
4 quality standards establish maximum concentrations in ambient air for suspended criteria pollutants.
5 These standards were adopted by the EPA to protect public health (primary standards) and public
6 welfare against decreased visibility, as well as damage to animals, crops, vegetation, and buildings
7 (secondary standards). These primary standards provide public health protection, including protecting
8 the health of “sensitive” populations such as asthmatics, children, and the elderly. The Forest Service
9 has reviewed the revised air quality modeling analysis, which included a number of additional
10 mitigation measures. These additional mitigation measures would further control fugitive PM₁₀
11 emissions (which could potentially contain such compounds as lead, arsenic, chromium, cadmium,
12 and nickel). The revised analysis indicates that the Barrel Alternative, the proposed action, and the
13 Phased Tailings Alternative would meet all Federal air quality standards at the perimeter fence line.
14 As currently designed, the Barrel Trail Alternative and Scholefield-McCleary Alternative would not
15 meet all Federal air quality standards at the perimeter fence line. Determination of the constituents of
16 particulates is not a standard analysis conducted when evaluating particulate emissions. For the
17 purposes of this analysis, it is presumed that if compliance with the PM₁₀ and PM_{2.5} NAAQS is
18 achieved, public health would be protected from potential toxic metals within the particulate
19 emissions as well. Therefore, the proposed action, Phased Tailings Alternative, and Barrel Alternative
20 would protect public health, while the Barrel Trail Alternative and Scholefield-McCleary Alternative
21 may have effects beyond the perimeter fence line that could be detrimental to human health. See the
22 “Air Quality and Climate Change” resource section in chapter 3 for further detail.

23 **Emergency Response to Accidents and Spills on Public Roadways**

24 As described above, traffic increases on public roads, primarily SR 83, would occur under all action
25 alternatives as a result of population growth and mine related traffic, including shipments of
26 hazardous materials. With any increase in traffic on public roads, a related increase in the potential for
27 accidents and hazardous materials spills could occur. Therefore, the need for emergency responses to
28 accidents and hazardous materials spills could increase as well. Although it is impossible to predict
29 how many accidents and hazardous materials spills would occur, if any, there would be a potential
30 increase in the demand for emergency responses.

31 Compared with the other action alternatives, the Barrel Alternative would have 63 fewer hazardous
32 materials round trips per week (or nine fewer hazardous materials trips per day) because of the
33 removal of the heap leach and oxide ore processing facilities. Therefore, the Barrel Alternative would
34 have the lowest potential for increasing the need for emergency responses of all the action
35 alternatives.

36 **Summary**

37 The Barrel Alternative would no longer need two hazardous materials on the mine site: sulfuric acid
38 and kerosene, used in oxide ore processing. Whereas the other action alternatives would consume up
39 to 160,000 short tons per year of sulfuric acid and 6.2 short tons of kerosene per year, the Barrel
40 Alternative would not require these reagents. This would reduce the amount of hazardous materials
41 delivery by 126 truck trips per week, compared with the other action alternatives.

1 Cumulative Effects

2 This cumulative effects discussion addresses the cumulative impacts of the action alternatives and any
3 applicable reasonably foreseeable actions as identified on the Coronado ID team's list of reasonably
4 foreseeable future actions, provided in the introduction to chapter 3. The following reasonably
5 foreseeable actions were determined to contribute to a cumulative impact to public health and safety:

- 6 • Demand for groundwater in the Sahuarita area is expected to increase by 200 percent by the
7 year 2030. Potential individual developments within the Sahuarita area include development
8 of the Farmers Investment Company property (known as Sahuarita Farms), the Rancho
9 Sahuarita development, the Quail Creek development, and the Madera Highlands
10 development.
- 11 • In late 2009, Freeport-McMoRan bought 8,900 acres of the long-closed Twin Buttes Mine
12 site, near Sahuarita. Required permits for reopening the mine have not been issued to date,
13 but it is reasonable to assume that this mine could be reopened at some point in the future.
- 14 • The Community Water Company of Green Valley is proposing delivery and recharge of
15 groundwater with water from the Central Arizona Project in the Green Valley area.
- 16 • The Farmers Investment Company is proposing extension of Central Arizona Project water
17 into actively farmed pecan groves and activation of a groundwater savings facility near
18 Sahuarita.
- 19 • Fuels reduction projects are proposed by the Forest Service and other agencies, including the
20 Catalina-Rincon FireScape Project, the Chiricahua FireScape Project, and proposed
21 hazardous fuels project on the Nogales Ranger District.

22 Groundwater use in the Sahuarita area is expected to double by the end of the mine life due to new
23 developments as well as the potential for reopening of the Twin Buttes mine, any or all of which
24 could increase the potential for subsidence. Conversely, two projects could deliver and recharge
25 Central Arizona Project water to the area of project withdrawal (Community Water Company of
26 Green Valley and Farmers Investment Company), which would tend to offset the effects of
27 groundwater pumping. Groundwater modeling used to assess impacts caused by pumping
28 incorporated future changes in groundwater use and some future recharge unrelated to the above-
29 mentioned recharge activities; thus, potential effects from these activities have already been
30 incorporated into the analysis and the cumulative impact with the Rosemont Copper Project water
31 supply pumping has been analyzed.

32 Recharge by Community Water Company and activation of the Farmers Investment Company
33 groundwater savings facilities were not incorporated into the groundwater models, as these potential
34 activities lack specifics concerning amounts of recharge and locations where the recharge could occur.
35 In general, offset of groundwater pumping by recharge or a groundwater savings facility would tend
36 to reduce the potential for subsidence. If recharge were to occur, the overall potential for subsidence
37 due to groundwater pumping could decrease or be eliminated in the recharge area.

38 Firescape and fuels reduction projects have the potential to contribute smoke into the atmosphere
39 from the use of prescribed fire. To minimize the impacts of smoke, land managers work closely with
40 ADEQ air quality managers in both planning and implementing prescribed fires. ADEQ's Air Quality
41 Division implements a smoke management plan that works toward a reduction in smoke impacts from
42 prescribed/controlled burning of nonagricultural fuels with particular regard to heavy forest fuels. All
43 State lands, parks and forests, as well as any federally managed lands in Arizona, are under the
44 jurisdiction of ADEQ in matters relating to air pollution from prescribed burning. To ensure smoke

1 dispersion during prescribed fires, land managers monitor atmospheric conditions closely before
2 prescribed fires are ignited. Factors evaluated include air movement, wind direction and speed,
3 atmospheric stability, and long-range weather forecasts. While short-term cumulative impacts to air
4 quality could result, violations of air quality standards are not expected.

5 ***Climate Change***

6 Anticipated changes in the climate of southern Arizona are not expected to contribute to or compound
7 any effects on public health and safety associated with the mine and associated activities.

8 **Mitigation Effectiveness**

9 Several mitigation measures apply to public health and safety concerns.

10 ***Mitigation and Monitoring – Forest Service***

- 11 • **Hazardous materials containment and management.** This mitigation involves handling,
12 storage, use and communication information about hazardous materials, in accordance with
13 laws and regulations. A variety of agencies have regulations defining what materials are
14 classified as hazardous, and how they should be transported, handles and stored. This
15 mitigation is expected to effectively reduce potential impacts to human health and
16 environmental risks (such as impacts to surface and groundwater quality) from transportation,
17 use and storage of hazardous materials.
- 18 • **Maintain material safety data sheets in accordance with 30 CFR 47.** This mitigation
19 involves maintaining material safety data sheets on-site; and providing this information to
20 emergency service providers. Regulations require material safety data sheets be available to
21 workers and that notification of potential hazards be provided to site visitors. Access to
22 material data safety sheets would also be provided to as appropriate emergency response
23 departments and hospitals. This would reduce impacts to worker and public health and safety
24 in the case of exposure, by allowing appropriate treatment to be implemented more rapidly,
25 and thus reduce the potential cost of emergency services.
- 26 • **Management techniques to reduce potential noise impacts from blasting.** This mitigation
27 is focused on noise management techniques, including generally limiting blasting to once per
28 day, during daylight hours; sequenced blasting using time-delay technology. Furthermore,
29 explosive usage is limited to 52 tons per day as consistent with the limits contained in the air
30 quality permit. While acute noise hazards from construction, traffic, equipment, and blasting
31 are unlikely, this mitigation would contribute to a reduced potential for acute impacts noise
32 hazards from blasting.
- 33 • **Construction of perimeter fence to exclude public from mine site.** This mitigation
34 involves construction of a perimeter fence to keep the public from coming into contact with
35 mining operations or potentially hazardous conditions. Furthermore, Federal air quality
36 standards are met at the perimeter fence for the proposed action, Phased Tailings, and Barrel
37 Alternatives and would therefore prevent the public from entering the areas where these
38 standards would not be met. This mitigation is expected to be effective in reducing the risk to
39 members of the public from the effects of degraded air quality in the immediate area of the
40 mine.
- 41 • **Preparation of emergency response and contingency plans, including a fire plan.** This
42 mitigation requires Rosemont Copper to coordinate with Emergency Medical Services

1 providers and local fire districts in development of emergency response and contingency
 2 planning. Pre-emergency planning and coordination with Emergency Medical Services
 3 providers and local fire districts would be expected to reduce response time and improve
 4 services of Emergency Medical Services, reducing effects from wildfires and potential human
 5 injuries from accidents.

6 ***Mitigation and Monitoring – Other Regulatory and Permitting Agencies***

- 7 • **Air quality mitigation to reduce release of pollutants.** Numerous elements were developed
 8 to reduce potential impacts on air quality from dust, vehicle emissions, and volatile chemicals
 9 related to mine activities. These would effectively reduce public exposure to levels of
 10 pollutants exceeding these standards. Refer to appendix B, items OA-AQ-01 through OA-
 11 AQ-10; and the “Air Quality and Climate Change” section of this chapter for further details
 12 on these mitigation measures and their effectiveness in reducing potential impacts.
- 13 • **The heap leach facility would be designed and located to reduce potential impacts to**
 14 **groundwater and surface water quality.** The heap leach facility, which is contained in all
 15 action alternatives except the Barrel Alternative, has been designed and located to reduce the
 16 risk of potential contamination of groundwater from seepage. It is designed to collect all
 17 possible drainage and solution; is located on top of a stable rock location; the liner system is
 18 designed to meet requirements of the aquifer protection permit; and the facility would be
 19 encapsulated by waste rock at closure to protect from stormwater infiltration. This mitigation
 20 would be effective at avoiding contamination to surface and groundwater that could affect
 21 water quality, including water that could be consumed by humans.
- 22 • **Equipment and methods to keep potentially contaminated water from being released**
 23 **into the environment.** This mitigation measure requires the use of appropriately sized lined
 24 ponds; retention of all contact stormwater for reuse as process water; and the installation of
 25 overflow alarms to alert operators of a potential overflow situation. It would avoid or reduce
 26 to potential for contamination of surface and groundwater.
- 27 • **Control and recycling of process water.** This mitigation avoids discharge of potentially
 28 contaminated water by containing all process water in lined facilities, to be recycled back into
 29 the process stream to offset fresh water use; and the installation of overflow alarms to alert
 30 operators of a potential overflow situation. It would avoid or reduce to potential for
 31 contamination of surface and groundwater.
- 32 • **Use of dry-stack tailings.** This mitigation requires the use of dry-stack tailings technology,
 33 which eliminated the need for traditional tailings impoundments; and allows tailings to be
 34 placed and compacted in a manner that would reduce seepage and avoids or reduces impacts
 35 related to potential groundwater contamination.
- 36 • **Implementation of stormwater pollution prevention plan.** This mitigation involves
 37 requirements to prepare a stormwater pollution prevention plan. The stormwater pollution
 38 prevention plan identifies methods to reduce potential pollution of stormwater; this plan is
 39 site specific, flexible, and constantly updated as needed. Implementation of the stormwater
 40 pollution prevention plan would prevent contact of stormwater with hazardous materials,
 41 thereby reducing the risk of release of contaminated water into the environment.
- 42 • **ADOT activities to mitigate impacts of increased traffic on SR 83.** This mitigation
 43 consists of Rosemont Copper providing funding to ADOT to implement activities to reduce
 44 impacts resulting from increased traffic on SR 83. ADOT has indicated the activities they
 45 plan to implement include 3-inch pavement overlay from I-10 to the intersection of the

1 primary access road; striping; raising guardrails and signs to match new pavement height; and
2 paving 3 existing bus pullouts for school bus use. Rosemont Copper and ADOT are currently
3 negotiating the amount of funding that would be provided. This mitigation would reduce
4 potential traffic safety hazards on SR 83.

5 ***Mitigation and Monitoring – Rosemont Copper***

- 6 • **Recharging the aquifer in the Tucson Active Management Area to offset pumping of**
7 **mine supply water.** Rosemont Copper intends to implement regional groundwater mitigation
8 measures within the Tucson Active Management Area by using available Central Arizona
9 Project water as a source to conduct recharge within Tucson Active Management Area
10 (Lower Santa Cruz). Recharge would occur as close as possible within the Tucson Active
11 Management Area to the Rosemont Copper well field. Rosemont Copper also intends to fund
12 a 7-mile extension of Central Arizona Project to deliver Community Water Company of
13 Green Valley’s Central Arizona Project allotment; and use the extra capacity of that pipeline
14 to recharge in the general vicinity of the mine supply wells. Should these mitigations be
15 implemented, they have to potential to compensate for some or all of the mine supply water
16 pumped out of the aquifer, and off-set the risk of subsidence related to Rosemont Copper
17 groundwater pumping in Sahuarita area.
- 18 • **Rosemont Copper plans to schedule deliveries to the mine to take place during nonpeak**
19 **traffic hours to avoid adding to traffic congestion.** Deliveries would be scheduled to
20 minimize material delivery on SR 83 during peak traffic hours (6:30 to 7:30 a.m. for
21 northbound traffic; and 5:00 to 6:00 p.m. for southbound traffic). Should Rosemont Copper
22 implement this plan, it has the potential to reduce impacts to the public from mine related
23 traffic on SR 83 during peak traffic hours.
- 24 • **Rosemont Copper intends to allow access to a new water source for firefighting efforts.**
25 Rosemont Copper has stated they would allow ASLD personnel to access the water fill
26 station at #2 booster pump station for firefighting purposes. The #2 booster pump station is
27 located along the water supply pipeline. Should this water source be made available to public
28 firefighting agencies for use in fire suppression actions, it could potentially reduce impacts
29 from wildfire and threats to public health and safety, particularly on and near the Santa Rita
30 Experimental Range, by providing a new water source to firefighting agencies.

31 ***Conclusion of Mitigation Effectiveness***

32 The Forest Service mitigation measure and the other regulatory and permitting agencies’ mitigation
33 measures listed above would effectively lower risks to public health and safety. However, these
34 mitigation measures would not avoid or eliminate all impacts and risks.

- 35 • Proper transport and storage of hazardous materials and coordination with local emergency
36 service providers would minimize the potential for accidental release but cannot completely
37 remove the potential that an on- or offsite accident will happen.
- 38 • Air quality mitigation would be effective at reducing emissions. Due in part to the application
39 of these mitigation measures, air quality was found to comply with State and Federal
40 regulations designed to protect public health and safety for the proposed action, Phased
41 Tailings Alternative, and Barrel Alternative. In addition, construction of a perimeter fence
42 would limit exposure of members of the public to emissions that may exceed national
43 standards.

- 1 • A number of groundwater and surface water mitigations would avoid or reduce the risk of
2 release of contaminants into the environment, thus reducing the risk of contaminants entering
3 into groundwater that is used by humans.
- 4 • ADOT mitigations for SR 83 would help to reduce impacts of increased traffic and contribute
5 to safer highway conditions.
- 6 Rosemont Copper mitigations have the potential to further reduce impacts to public health and safety
7 should they occur.
- 8 • Groundwater recharge in the Upper Santa Cruz Sub-Basin may help alleviate the possibility
9 of subsidence and the associated impact to public health and safety.
- 10 • Scheduling deliveries to the mine outside peak traffic periods would avoid adding those
11 vehicle trips to existing traffic.
- 12 • Providing a new source of water for firefighting efforts could improve the effectiveness of
13 firefighting efforts, particularly in the vicinity the Santa Rita Experimental Range. If fires are
14 controlled and extinguished when they are small, the result would be less smoke produced
15 and reduced risk to members of the public in the vicinity of the wildfire.